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A common error in popular expressions of political economy is the presumption that all 
firms oppose … regulations because these edicts raise costs. The flaw in this presumption 
arises from an exclusive focus … on the “direct effects” of regulation …(T)he often 
pronounced heterogeneity among firms [also] gives rise to … “indirect effects” – the 
competitive advantages that arise from asymmetrical distributions of regulatory effect 
among different groups of firms and workers. It is extremely important to recognize that 
for many firms and workers the indirect effects of regulation can outweigh … the direct 
effects. (Bartel and Thomas, 1987, pp. 239-240.) 
  
Our own research and experience with the issue of unjust dismissal indicate that 
employers and employer organizations have almost always opposed unjust-dismissal 
legislation. Except for the state of Montana, we know of no instances in which employers 
have taken the initiative to propose legislation in response to judicial decisions modifying 
the employment-at-will doctrine. (Stieber and Block, 1992, p. 792.) 
 
No other kind of labor legislation [as workers’ compensation] gained such general 
acceptance in so brief a period in this country. (Weiss, 1935, p. 575.) 
 
Does anyone seriously believe that an efficient balance can be achieved through a 
political process? The flexibility to respond to the demands of market competition yields 
enormous benefits, but such benefits, because they tend to be diffused and delayed, have 
no organized constituency. So policies that restrict labor market flexibility create costs 
that are largely ignored politically. But these restrictions typically concentrate the 
benefits of security (protection from competition) on politically organized groups that 





In this paper we discuss the political economy of labor regulation in the United States. As 
a practical matter, the subject has been neglected by labor economists who have almost 
exclusively focused on the effects of legislation. The determinants of regulation have 
tended only to be investigated in the context of potential omitted variables and 
simultaneous equations bias. The role of rent seeking in the political market place has 
rarely been carefully analyzed in the area of labor regulation. Rather, the tendency has 
been to assert and at best to infer such influence. In the cases of unemployment insurance 
and workers compensation, for example, the cross subsidization involved – respectively, 
from low- to high-unemployment industries and from low- to high accident industries – 
has been argued to create incentives for those so subsidized to engage the polity, 
underscored by the phenomenon of rational ignorance. Similarly, it has been   2
conventional to attribute national legislation on minimum wages to the congressional 
majority of northern states which coalesced to suppress competition from the smaller 
number of southern states paying lower wages and which in turn voted against the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. This strategy of raising rivals’ costs has of course almost invariably 
been laid at the door of organized labor for virtually all labor regulation. That is, 
organized labor has always and everywhere been credited with supporting labor 
legislation as a means of raising the costs of nonunion labor and hence shifting demand in 
its favor (i.e. reducing competition for its jobs). 
 
The U.S. situation is necessarily complicated by the fact that much labor legislation is 
state-originated/financed and administered. One of the strengths of federalism is the 
opportunity it presents for the development of intergovernmental competition. The 
models of Tiebout (1956) and Oates and Schwab (1988) demonstrate the efficiency 
features of interjurisdictional competition, and a number of observers otherwise hostile to 
labor mandates see potential benefit in some such programs, most notably workers’ 
compensation (from a transaction costs  perspective). The argument is that the absence of 
federal influence admits of substantial variation across states that can permit 
experimentation that over time reveals desirable and undesirable feature, allowing the 
gradual evolution of the system (Bellante and Porter, 1990, p. 673). By the same token, 
there are undoubtedly negative effects (spillovers) that need to be addressed and a 
potential role for government in holding the ring and monitoring competition among 
states and local governments. These issues have been well rehearsed in the taxation 
literature (see for example Altemeyer-Bartscher and Kuhn, 2005; Wildasin, 1989, 2004; 
Wilson, 1986, 1999; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004), 2004), but to my knowledge have 
largely escaped serious consideration in the labor regulation literature.     
 
A further complication in labor regulation is the role of the common law. We will 
examine the view that legislation is a potential antidote in a federal system to the 
inefficiencies introduced by activist judiciaries. The issue here is the attenuation of a 
specific common law doctrine, but absent this there is also the basic issue of the costs of 
using the court system that we will address in the particular context of workers’   3
compensation. But the issue of differential subversion, namely, the idea that the courts 
have been more susceptible to capture than the legislature and that the switch to the latter 
at the beginning of the last century in the United States was an efficient response (Glaeser 
and Shleifer, 2003), is left to others. Nor for that matter do we elaborate on the role of the 
courts as a vehicle for restraining overarching legislation at state (and federal) level.
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At this stage it seems premature to seek a unified framework for evaluating labor 
regulation in the United States (but for a general approach, see Amable and Gatti, 2004). 
Rather, we elect to provide information on several types of labor regulation at federal 
state and local level, each of which offers a different spin on regulatory behavior. We 
first examine the political economy of OSHA, to show the scope that exists for raising the 
costs of rivals by engaging the polity. We then turn to the case of unjust dismissals to 
show how regulation might be a corrective to the actions of interventionist judiciaries. 
Next, we tackle right-to-work legislation as an example of a partial political escape route 
affixed to national legislation. Only then do we consider safety regulation and workers’ 
compensation which arena offers the richest literature on the political economy of 
regulation and formal evidence on the use of regulation to raise rivals costs. Finally, we 
take a look at living wage ordinances and prevailing wages to update the minimum wage 
argument and identify the union ‘interest.’  In a concluding section, we roughly draw 
together the threads of the preceding arguments. 
 
 
II.  Themes in Labor Regulation 
(i) The Scope for Raising Rivals Costs: The Case of OSHA  
Perhaps the best estimates of the net benefits to (some) firms and workers
2 of labor 
regulation are provided by Bartel and Thomas (1985, 1987) in the context of 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations. The authors use the 
term “predation” to describe the actions of these interest groups. We focus here on the 
authors’ analysis of the direct and indirect effects of Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) regulations, even if the data on OSHA compliance costs in the 
study – as contrasted with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations
3 – are   4
sketchy.  Recalling the first of our opening quotations, the direct effects of regulation are 
the partial equilibrium effects of workplace safety laws on individual firms and persons. 
The indirect effects stem from compliance asymmetries and enforcement asymmetries; 
the former stem from economies of scale (smaller firms experience a larger unit-cost 
effect) and plant age, while the latter reflect regulations that are “systematically skewed”  
against particular groups of firms/workers. In each case, the authors have strong priors.  
They contend that there are strong economies of scale for compliance with OSHA 
regulations, and also that plants located in northern and midwestern states by virtue of 
their age would have higher compliance costs were the regulations are evenly enforced 
(their own research pointing to regional enforcement asymmetries favoring these Frost- 
Belt firms, as well as more intensive enforcement against small and nonunion firms).  
 
Bartel and Thomas (1987) evaluate the effects of regulation on total industry rents, 
namely, workers’ wages and the price cost margin. The authors approximate the 
compliance costs of OSHA by the dollar value of penalties assessed for violations of 
safety standards (some 90 percent of the total) in 22 states, 1974-78.
4  For the wage 
equation, these compliance costs are divided by the number of workers, for the price-cost 
margin they are divided by the value of shipments. The other key independent variables 
are plant size (percentage of workers in plants with 250 or more employees), the 
percentage of industry employment that is in the Frost Belt, and the percentage of 
workers in the industry covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Each is interacted 
with the regulation variable(s). For the wage equation, the controls include several 
characteristics of the workforce, average establishment size, overtime hours, research and 
development expenditures and advertising expenditure per employee, the four-firm 
concentration ratio, the annual growth in shipments, and year dummies. The union 
variable is interacted with the regulation argument and with the two intangible capital 
measures to detect evidence of differential rent seeking. The price-cost margin equation 
additionally includes various proxies for expenses, the value of assets again in relation to 
sales, and the annual growth in materials cost. Here the large firm and Frost-Belt 
variables are interacted with the regulation variable (and unionism). 
   5
The direct effects of OSHA regulations are obtained simply by suppressing the 
interaction terms. For the price-cost margin (wages) these direct effects are sizeable and 
negative (positive). Allowing for indirect effects, the interaction terms between the 
regulation variable and the large firm proxy and a Frost-Belt location are both positive 
and well determined, reflecting compliance and enforcement asymmetries.  Also as 
expected, the advantage of larger firms and a Frost-Belt location are dissipated in the 
presence of unionism: estimated at mean coverage, unions gobble up almost one-half of 
these regulation-induced rents. Turning to the wage equation, the interaction terms are 
again as expected: the coefficients for the firm size and regional interaction terms are 
positive and statistically significant. The direct effects of regulation on wages are now 
negative and well determined, but there is no indication of successful union dissipation of 
advertising rents (as was indicated in the price-cost margin equation). 
 
To determine whether predators gain on net, the authors estimate the relative importance 
of the direct effects and indirect effect of regulations at their mean values (and mean 
values of the dependent variables). Estimates are provided for minimum, mean, and 
maximum values of the large firm and Frost-Belt arguments. For an industry with the 
maximum share of workers in establishments with at least 250 workers, the reported net 
gain in profits is 2.9 percent; for an industry with the largest percentage of its workers in 
the Frost Belt the profits gain is 9.1 the corresponding gains for unionized workers are 
3.2 and 3.8 percent, respectively.  
 
The bottom line from this study is that two distinct groups gain from regulation. The 
logical inference is that they may be expected to actively support OSHA and that the 
indirect effects of regulation are indicative of predation, not innocuous by-products of the 
public pursuit of workplace safety (Bartel and Thomas, 1987, p. 241).   
 
(ii) Legislation as a Corrective: The Political Compromise Hypothesis  
In an interesting discussion of unjust dismissal legislation in the United States at state 
level, Krueger (1991) argues that legislation is an antidote to if not the casuistic rulings of 
the American courts then certainly to the (manner of the) attenuation of the common law   6
at-will  principle. He seemingly accepts that the at-will doctrine would otherwise permit 
efficient transacting. Given the judicial innovations, however, there is scope for unjust 
dismissal legislation to clarify property rights to jobs and to reduce uncertainty/limit 
employer liability. He is thus offering a second-best rationale for legislation. His analysis 
proceeds at two levels. The first is a discussion of the origins of legislation in the one 
U.S. state to have adopted an unjust dismissal statute, Montana; the other is an analysis of 
legislative proposals in all state legislatures linked to the degree of attenuation of the at-
will principle. 
 
The keynote of the institutional analysis is the large awards given to those adjudged to 
have been wrongfully dismissed in that state, as well as other states (see also Dertouzos, 
Holland, and Ebener, 1988). The cet. par. analysis shifts to national developments and in 
particular the (up to) three type of exceptions to at-will recognized in the state courts – 
the public policy, implied contract, and good faith exceptions – in some 42 states, and the 
ten pieces of legislation that have been introduced in nine states, including Montana. The 
maintained hypothesis is that legislation can be expected to receive support from both 
sides of industry because the attenuation of at-will has produced uncertain and 
incomplete property rights to jobs and large transaction costs/highly variable awards in 
disputes over improper dismissals. Enter the political compromise hypothesis: unjust 
dismissal laws may be “an acceptable compromise between limited employer liability 
and assumption of fault” (Krueger, 1991, p. 653). The prediction is that legislation is 
more likely in states where exceptions have already been recognized by the courts.  
 
Krueger estimates a simple logit model of the determinants of legislation, 1981-88. In 
substitution for each (lagged) exception entered individually, in one specification he 
includes the total number of exceptions. Controls include the proportion of workers in a 
state who are union members, the proportion of Democrats in the state legislature, the 
proportion of state employment in manufacturing, and the state unemployment rate. On 
average, the presence of the public policy exception increases the probability that a state 
legislature will propose an unjust dismissal statute by 8.5 percent, a good faith exception 
by 6.7 percent, and an implied contract exception by 2.0 percent (although the latter   7
coefficient estimate is poorly determined). For its part, the specification with the total 
number of exceptions in a state implies that each additional exception raises the 
probability of legislative innovation by 5.2 percentage points. The coefficient estimates 
of the other arguments are statistically insignificant. While concluding that laws may be 
an efficient alternative to an attenuated at-will doctrine, Krueger has to conclude that the 
threat to employers is not yet great enough to provoke sufficient support for legislation. 
One reason of course may be the heightened use of temporary or atypical workers not 
subject to the predations of the courts (see below). 
 
Krueger’s view has attracted controversy, most obviously because there is no attempt to 
model employer support. Another issue is whether the bills introduced into the nine state 
legislatures accurately portray employer support for legislation. Thus, for example, 
Stieber and Block (1992) argue that employers may have been reacting to other 
legislation that they had no hand in shaping and which arguably was more coercive. 
Krueger (1992, p. 797) counters that employers will be “less resistant” – maybe even 
reluctantly favor – legislation if the common law has been modified. In turn, this 
comment reveals the lingering imprecision of the argument. Why for example should the 
public policy exception be the seemingly most important exception? How costly has it 
proven in practice? And what were the differences between the three states in the sample 
recognizing all three exceptions – Connecticut, Montana, and Nevada – that led just one 
of them to introduce legislation? 
 
The most interesting conclusion of Krueger’s (1991, p. 659) political compromise model 
is that the “threat to employers under the common law is not yet great enough in most 
states to provoke sufficient support for legislation.” As was hinted at earlier, one reason 
for this may be the growth in employment forms not subject in practice to judicial review, 
most notably temporary agency employment which has grown much faster than open-
ended employment in the last three decades. Autor (2003) has recently examined the 
growth of the temporary help service (THS) industry between 1979 and 1995 and linked 
this to the erosion of the common law at-will principle. Using data the Census Bureau’s 
County Business Patterns files and the ORG files of the Current Population Survey, he   8
finds that THS employment is positively associated with the implied contract exception 
but not to the other exceptions in his favored fixed effects specification that also contains 
a set of state-specific time trends. This result, which is consistent with his priors,
6 is 
robust to additional controls such as labor force demographics and the percentage of the 
state workforce that is unionized. (Interestingly, the latter coefficient estimate is negative 
and highly significant, indicating that temporary employment grew less rapidly in states 
where unions declined less – given the decline in union density of over one-third over the 
sample period – which is of course consistent with union opposition to THS 
employment.)  The bottom line is the finding that the implied contract exception 
contributed about 500,000 additional jobs (or some 20 percent) to the growth of THS 
employment. Independently, slower rates of union decline added to this total. 
 
In Krueger (1991) the exceptions to at-will are taken to be exogenous. In a subsequent 
study of the state employment effects of these legal incursions, 1980-87, Dertouzos and 
Karoly (1992, 1993) argue that the probability of having one of the wrongful dismissal 
doctrines is strongly related with a number of state characteristics. Their instruments are 
whether a state had a right to work law (see subsection (iii) below), whether it had a 
Republican governor, the level and change in union density, the change in 
unemployment, the percentage of neighboring states recognizing a similar exception, the 
percentage change in lawyers per capita, and year dummies. They find that right-to-work 
states and those with a Republican governor (indicative of a conservative attitude toward 
labor) are less likely to have either a tort-based or contract-based exception, while the 
converse is true for the degree of unionization variable. There is also some evidence of 
spillover: the higher the fraction of neighboring states that have recognized the respective 
doctrine, the more likely is the state to have the doctrine. The effect of the other 
instruments is either mixed or statistically insignificant. 
 
Dertouzos and Karoly model the determinants of the exceptions to at-will in an attempt to 
provide unbiased estimates of their employment effects, since they argue there is 
simultaneous determination of the employment and the legal environment. Having 
instrumented the doctrine/remedy, the authors use the predicted values in place of the   9
actual doctrines/remedy in the employment equation. Their principal finding is that 
aggregate employment is on average 2.9 (1.8) percent lower following a state’s 
recognition of tort (contractual) damages for wrongful termination in a fixed effect model 
in which the regressors include gross state product and the growth in gross state product. 
The crucial issues here as elsewhere are that the instrument should have a direct causal 
impact on the exception to at-will and no effect on the outcome indicator other than 
through its influence on the at-will exception. As noted by Autor, Donahue, and Schwab 
(2001, pp. 33-35), two of the variables selected as instrument (court activities in 
neighboring states and the presence of a right to work law) have a substantial regional 
component relating to the South (the former negatively and the latter positively). Since 
the South has grown persistently faster than other U.S. regions since 1930, there is a 
correlation between the two instruments and preexisting growth rates which has the effect 
of biasing the results toward finding that wrongful discharge laws lower employment. 
Accordingly, the appropriate estimation strategy is to give each state its own time trend. 
In their replication of the Dertouzos and Karoly model including a linear state trend, 
Autor, Donahue, and Schwab (2001, Table 18) fail to obtain statistically significant 
coefficient estimates for the instrumented wrongful-termination doctrines.
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(iii) Right to Work Legislation. Plus ça change?  
The 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) required employers to bargain in good 
faith with unions that represented a majority of their employees, and made it illegal for 
employers to interfere with their employees’ right to organize effectively. Further, section 
8(c) of the NLRA allowed employer-union agreements requiring union membership as a 
condition of employment. The 1947 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), 
which restricted some aspects of union activity (by identifying  unfair labor practices on 
the part of unions), still permitted union (if not closed) shops, but unequivocally 
authorized states to adopt right-to-work laws prohibiting these arrangements under 
section 14(b). As a matter of fact, 12 states had rules prohibiting at least some forms of 
compulsory unionism prior to Taft-Hartley, so that the main technical legal effect of this 
section was to remove the possibility for unions to challenge right-to-work laws in court 
on grounds of federal supremacy.   10
 
Atypically, the determinants of right-to-work laws have been fairly extensively studied in 
the labor economics literature. But the purpose is again indirect: to obtain unbiased 
estimates of the effects of the law on several outcome indicators. Chief among these has 
been union membership, hypothesized to be reduced in the presence of right-to-work 
laws either by reason of increased union organizing and maintenance costs (as union 
shops cannot be used to curb free riding), or because of reduced bargaining power 
(stemming from the lack of universal membership within the bargaining unit) leading to 
reduced benefits from unionism and a long-run decline in membership. To the extent that 
right-to-work laws mirror existing tastes for unionism and the extent of unionism there is 
both an omitted variables problem and a simultaneous equations bias. The effects 
literature has therefore sought in often ingenious ways to control for the nonrandom 
presence of right-to-work laws (for surveys, see Moore and Newman, 1985; Moore, 
1998).  
 
Variables in the right-to-work equation have tended to reflect the simple view that 
employers favor and unions oppose such legislation. Union density is found to have a 
strongly negative impact on the likelihood that a state has a right-to-work law, although 
distinct employer arguments do not seem to have been deployed. Other variables have 
included economic development (poor states tend to adopt RTW laws to promote 
growth), degree of urbanization/population density (higher values for both of which are 
presumed to indicate ‘collectivist views’ facilitating the passage of legislation), and the 
proportion of the workforce that is female (higher shares are supposed for various reasons 
– tastes, labor force attachment, and job composition grounds – to favor right-to-work 
laws). 
 
After taking the taste effects of right-to-work laws into account or treating the right-to-
work status of states as endogenous, the point effects of the laws are often poorly 
determined. The same appears to be true of fixed-effect and disequilibrium models as 
well. The main exception is the fixed effect stock-adjustment model of Ellwood and Fine 
(1987) who find that right-to-work laws have a sizeable initial effect on organizing that   11
decays through time. Be that as it may, the authors also find that in the period before 
passage of a right-to-work law union organizing activity is not depressed but is rather 
somewhat above average. The authors speculate that such laws may even be passed when 
unions are becoming stronger. Not dissimilar reasoning is usually employed to explain 
the national legislation. Thus, the unprecedented wave of strikes in the winter of 1945 
and the first half of 1946, and evidence of widespread union racketeering, is widely 
viewed as yielding a broad consensus that the NLRA had been too one sided in favor of 
unions. On this view, Taft-Hartley went some way to evening the scales (Baird, 1998, p. 
482). 
 
This line of reasoning also surfaces in an interesting case study of right-to-work 
campaigns in Louisiana in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1970s by Canak and Miller (1990) who 
focus on the involvement of business. The authors frame their study as a test of whether 
the two sides of industry are always in opposition or whether there is an historical accord 
between big business and labor. They conclude that typically both large and small 
businesses oppose unions but that some companies, again from both segments, mute their 
opposition when they perceive that unions are capable of effective retaliation. The link 
with the previous argument resides in Canak and Miller’s argument that union organizing 
drives mobilized anti-labor organizations in each of the three decades examined. In the 
1940s and 1970s larger companies in Louisiana played a public role in organizing and 
financing right-to-work campaigns. Their opposition became sotto voce in the 1950s, 
which new-found reticence the authors ascribe to pragmatic necessity: “The dominant 
[post-war] position of American business … made it possible to enjoy fast growth and 
high profits. They feared business interruptions more than high wages and, therefore, 
avoided public support for RTW so as not to foster conflict with their unionized workers” 
(Canak and Miller, 1990, p. 264). What made the actions of business successful were 
inter-union divisions and ultimately international competition and  redistricting. The 
actions in question are sequentially the passage of laws restricting union strikes activity, 
the passage of right to work legislation in 1954 and its repeal in 1956, and a new-right-to-
work law in 1976.  
   12
The bottom line in respect of the political economy of right-to-work legislation is that the 
battle over union security will continue to be fought in the states “one state at a time, 
again and again” (Baird, 1998, p. 491). A further look at the equilibrium outcomes would 
be helpful. 
 
(iv) The Case of Workplace Safety Reform and Workers’ Compensation 
Some of the most interesting work on the political economy of regulation has 
documented the course of state-level safety regulation in mining and manufacturing, and 
the related reform of workers’ compensation, introduced well in advance of the New Deal 
legislation.
8 This literature identifies the circumstances where employers favored 
legislation to raise rivals’ costs, but more generally pays close attention to the bargaining 
process between employers and workers.
9 We examine safety regulation and workers’ 
compensation in turn.  
 
Workplace Safety Legislation. The pioneering study is Fishback’s (2005) analysis of the 
role of large firms in influencing safety regulations in coal mines and factories, 1869-
1930. He characterizes their strategies as either defensive (either opposing regulation 
outright or limiting the breadth of regulation) or predatory/subversive (raising rivals’ 
costs).  His focus is primarily on safety regulations rather than workers’ compensation 
per se. (Fishback and Kantor (1994; 1996a,b; 2000) focus exclusively on workers 
compensation which, as we shall see, is depicted as a ‘win-win’ situation for large firms, 
unions, and political reform groups, if not the insurance industry.) The strategies of large 
employers (establishments with 500 or more employees) are inferred to differ as between 
branches. It is expected that a strategy of raising rivals’ costs will be associated with 
earlier adoption of state laws, wider regulation, and with more resources devoted to 
policing the regulations; and conversely for defensive strategies.  
 
For manufacturing, he considers the determinants of the introduction of labor 
administrations (with and without coercive power) and factory inspectorates (to enforce 
the regulations). For coal mining, he considers the determinants of the introduction of 
coal mine safety laws, a regulation index based on a count of the number of mine   13
regulations introduced, and the inspection budget.  The methodology for manufacturing is 
a Weibull hazard specification with time-varying regressors. The goal is therefore to 
address the timing of labor administration and factory inspectorate innovations. Apart 
from the proxy for large firms (average employment size), the regressors are 
manufacturing employment, either a union index  (measuring the share of workers in 
manufacturing relative to the national average) or the number of union chapters,  and a 
dummy for Southern states.  It is found that the hazard ratios are greater than unity for 
larger firms, consistent with earlier adoption. Specifically, a one standard deviation 
increase in firm size is associated with a 31 (28) percent increase in the conditional 
probability of adopting some form of labor administration (factory inspectorate). 
Fishback argues that this finding is inconsistent with the view that large firms sought to 
obstruct legislation. The union hazard ratios are both mixed and poorly determined so 
that it is difficult to conclude that they either contributed to or were opposed to 
legislation. One interpretation, and that favored by Fishback, is that unions were likely 
more interested in building up their organizational strength to obtain influence than to 
engage the polity. 
  Opposite results are obtained for coal mining in regressions estimated over a 
reduced number of states (with bituminous coal production). That is, larger mines are not 
associated with earlier adoption of coal safety legislation. This time, however, the union 
‘effect’ exceeds unity and is statistically significant at conventional  levels. Since the 
former result might indicate that “larger mines were indifferent to coal regulations or that 
they were unsuccessful in staving off the efforts of reformers” (p. 19), Fishback also 
estimates OLS and state and year fixed effect models of the determinants of the size of 
the inspection budget per coal worker and a coal mining law index capturing the reach of 
legislation. The size of mine argument is negatively associated with each outcome 
indicator. Union effects are measured by the share of the workforce in the United 
Mineworkers and are weak throughout, a result that might hint at inadequate inspections 
and (as before) induced self reliance to effect change. Fishback concludes that taken in 
the round his results for mining indicate that larger employers were successful in limiting 
the reach of legislation and in reducing inspection budgets. 
   14
At issue of course is why employers adopted a defensive strategy in one sector but not in 
the other. Fishback’s answer exploits the disparate nature of manufacturing vis-à-vis 
mining (such that a common set of laws may have left many parts of the manufacturing 
sector unaffected); the more adversarial nature of industrial relations in coal mining, 
coupled with the fact that the reform proposals emanated largely from organized labor; 
and the virtual absence of women in coal mining (it being easier to ‘sell’ regulation for 
women and harder to obstruct regulation).  
 
Workers’ Compensation.  State workers’ compensation plans provide for employer-
mandated no-fault insurance covering workplace injuries, coupled with limits on liability 
from lawsuits. The passage of workers’ compensation laws in several states during the 
1910s constituted one of the earliest and most important government interventions in the 
workplace. Currently, workers’ compensation is compulsory in all but three states (New 
Jersey, South Carolina, and Texas).
10 Workers are eligible for medical and partial 
indemnity (lost wage) benefits when disabled by job-related injury or illness. Employers 
are liable regardless of fault but may dispute the severity of an injury or illness or 
challenge whether it is work related. Workers compensation costs are nominally paid 
through employer payroll taxes (but see below). A few states require that employers 
insure through a state-operated insurance system. Many states operate a state system but 
permit insurance through private insurance companies or self insurance. (The system 
exhibits close to full experience rating in the case of larger firms.) 
 
Prior to workers’ compensation a system of common law negligence liability obtained. 
Employers were obligated to exercise “due care” in protecting their workers against 
hazards at the workplace. Employees bore the burden of proof, however, and had to 
demonstrate that the employer’s negligence was the cause of the injury. A negligent 
employer might nevertheless rely on one of three legal escape routes, including 
contributory negligence. 
 
The change from negligence liability to a no-fault system is well described by Fishback 
and Kantor (2000). They give chapter and verse on the high transactions costs (in money   15
and uncertainty) to employers of using the courts and describe how 25-40 percent of any 
compensation awarded employees might be swallowed up in legal fees. Accordingly, 
they identify a broad consensus favoring reform and describe the outcome as a win-win 
situation – for all but trial lawyers. Disputation was over the details: state-run versus 
private insurance and the level of indemnity benefits. In the former area, organized labor 
lined up against the insurance companies (employers offered mixed support for a state-
run insurance fund); in the latter organized labor and large employers were in obvious 
contention (but see immediately below). The outcomes were determined by variations in 
the political strength of these groups (see also Fishback and Kantor, 1996b). 
 
Additional insight into employer support for workers’ compensation (and the speed with 
which the laws were enacted across most states) can be gleaned from an analysis of 
wages. Fishback and Kantor (1994) contend that although expected injury compensation 
rose considerably with the passage of the state laws – both as a result of more individuals 
receiving compensation and compensation levels that were considerably higher than 
under negligence liability – much or all of the employers’ costs were shifted back onto 
employees. The authors construct three panels for relatively dangerous industries – 
coalmining (1911-22), lumber (1910-13, 1915, 1921, and 1923), and union contracts in 
the building trades (1907-13) – in each case regressing hourly earnings in a state   
regressed on an index of expected injury benefits (computed both prior to and after the 
introduction of workers’ compensation) and a fairly wide set of controls (product prices 
or demand index, output per man, unionization, strike activity, and occupation dummies, 
etc). For coal mining the authors’ fixed effect estimates suggest that workers not only 
paid for the sharply-stepped increase in their expected benefits but may also have fully 
paid the employers’ costs of purchasing insurance to provide those benefits. In the lumber 
industry, there appears to have been a full wage offset. But in unionized business 
construction (and indeed unionized coalmining) the coefficient estimate for the expected 
benefits variable was statistically insignificant, indicating an absence of any downward 
adjustment. These results were broadly robust to specification and to sample (restricting 
the sample to states and years when workers’ compensation was in effect.). Fishback and 
Kantor (1994, p. 19) conclude: “The presence of wage offsets for nonunion workers also   16
helps solve one of the major puzzles in political economy of the passage of workers 
compensation [viz. the leadership taken by employer groups ] … Many employers may 
have supported the legislation in anticipation of passing a substantial portion of the costs 
onto their workers in the form of lower wages.”  
 
Nevertheless, Fishback and Kantor (1996a) also report that employers (while favoring 
workers compensation) and unions feuded over the issue of benefit levels, noting that 
where they were unable to reach a compromise the introduction of workers’ 
compensation was delayed for up to 15 years! One reason for this is the failure to observe 
wage offsets in union settings, noted earlier. Employers of unionized labor may then have 
had a strong incentive to minimize the size of injury benefits that they paid. Further, we 
have seen that the cost of insurance was not fully shifted back on to (nonunion) workers 
outside of coalmining. Nor was this pass back instantaneous. In this later study, therefore, 
Fishback and Kantor focus attention on the determinants of their index of expected injury 
benefits, 1910-30. The key regressors are an index of the risk of accidents in 
manufacturing, an index of unionization in manufacturing, measures of the strength of 
farm and manufacturing interests, the proportions of large and small firms, and 
manufacturing value added per worker. In addition, as indicators of the ‘political climate’ 
the authors identify power shifts in the legislature, percent of the presidential vote for a 
republican candidate and for a socialist candidate, and the presence of a workers’ 
compensation bureaucracy (instrumented). One of the most important findings is that 
states with higher manufacturing risk had lower benefit levels. In turn, this suggests that 
employers in the most dangerous industries had considerable strength in state legislatures, 
and used this influence to keep their overall accident costs down. That said, greater union 
density in a state and the presence of a bureaucratic agency to administer the law (the 
alternative was through the court system) were each associated with higher expected 
benefits, cet. par. There is also some indication in the authors’ data that political party 
shifts in either one or both legislative chambers at state level were associated with higher 
benefit levels. But political attitudes as indexed through votes in national elections were 
unimportant in explaining benefits, which result the authors interpret as suggesting that 
the views of state-level political parties did not necessarily match those of their national-  17
level parents.  Fishback and Kantor supplement this analysis with case studies of the 
political battle over benefits in the states of Ohio, Minnesota and Missouri. These case 
studies offer a much more detailed investigation of the role of interest groups in shaping 
the final content of workers’ compensation laws and the timing of those laws (see in 
particular the case of Missouri). 
 
The bottom line with respect to both safety regulation and workers’ compensation is that 
the bills that entered into law were “more evolutionary than revolutionary” and the result 
of compromises (Fishback, 1997, p. 50).  The employer side had material political power 
and in order to secure legislation labor had in many instances to work with them or a 
subset of them.   
 
(v) The Strange Case of Living Wage Ordinances  
Living wages have been in operation in the United States since they were first introduced 
in Baltimore 1994. Today around 100 cities, counties, and school districts have living 
wage ordinances. They resemble minimum wage laws but differ in setting a higher wage 
that is most often fixed with reference to the poverty line. That said, they are much more 
highly restricted, typically covering city contractors, or companies receiving business 
assistance from the city. Just as with minimum wages, most of the literature covers the 
effects of such regulation on the wage/poverty outcome, but a recent paper by Neumark 
(2001) explores the notion that municipal unions organize to pass living wage laws as a 
form of rent seeking. Focusing on the narrow coverage of the laws, Neumark argues that 
these ‘other interests’ (the municipal unions) raise the wages that contractors must pay 
and thereby reduce the incentives for cities to contract out work ordinarily done by 
municipal employees. (His maintained hypothesis is that if the goal of ordinances is 
poverty reduction, they should be more general wage floors; on which more below.) 
 
Neumark examines the wage and employment consequences of living wage laws in 19 
cities. But first he seeks some prima facie evidence of union involvement. To this end, he 
first conducts a simple Internet search, looking for joint mention of living wages and the 
cities concerned (i.e. those with the ordinances) and next adds a union descriptor   18
(beginning with the AFL-CIO). A large share of the former number of hits included the 
AFL-CIO, or a specific union; most were for two unions that play a prominent role in 
organizing local government workers: the American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal employees (AFSCME) and the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU). In a final step, Neumark looks for evidence of union advocacy for living wages 
in the material, and cites some such instances of involvement.   
 
His cet. par. analysis uses quarterly data from the CPS ORG files from January 1996 
through December 2000. The match is SMSAs for cities, an imperfect fit since suburban 
residents may work in the city; it is local government employees for municipal workers, 
which is again an imperfect match as some individuals may work for units of government 
below state level. The sample is restricted to SMSA individuals aged 16-17 years. The 
dependent variables are (a) the share of unionized municipal workers in the city’s labor 
force, and (b) the wages of unionized municipal workers. It is expected that living wage 
laws reduce the incentive to contract out, thereby raising the city-level employment share 
of unionized municipal workers. This is dubbed a ‘strong test’ because the more obvious 
result may simply be an increase in union bargaining power, rather than in contracting 
behavior. This leads to the second and weaker test, which is that this enhanced bargaining 
power only impacts wages. It is anticipated that markets for low-wage unionized workers 
– specifically, those earning less than the median wage – will be most impacted. The 
methodology is difference-in-differences. Formally, the right-hand-side variables are the 
higher of the federal or state minimum wage, and the city living wage, as well as the city 
and year (and quarter) dummies. All wage variables are in logs and are converted to 
hourly equivalents.  
 
There is no evidence that the share of the workforce made up of unionized municipal 
workers – the strong test – is affected by the living wage, irrespective of whether or not a 
distinction is drawn between low-wage (i.e. below-median) unionized municipal workers 
and independent of the lags on the living wage and minimum wage arguments. However, 
for the weaker test, namely, that living wages will boost the wages of unionized 
municipal workers, there is evidence that living wages ordinances boost union pay both   19
contemporaneously and with a 4-quarter lag. For below-median unionized municipal 
workers, living wages exceeding the minimum wage by 30 percent – which apparently is 
not uncommon (see also Adams and Neumark, 2005, Table 1) – would have the effect of 
raising the wages of union workers by around 4.5 percent. It is reported that living wages 
do not influence the earnings of ‘municipal worker groups’ for whom they are not 
expected to apply (e.g. teachers and police), which gives us some confidence in the prior 
results, and also that the positive earnings effect on union wages holds for the center of 
the wage distribution but not the extremes (substituting centiles from the 30
th to the 90
th 
for the median), suggesting some fragility of the wage result.
11
 
Further, case studies of living wage ordinances in Los Angeles, San Jose, Oakland, and 
San Diego by Zabin and Martin (1999) call into question the test used by Neumark 
(2001), while offering some political insights. In the first place, the authors see the 
narrow scope of living wage ordinances as strategic – helping guarantee success – and as 
providing a basis for expansion from service contractors through recipients of direct 
subsidies, loans and or tax breaks through to holders of public leases and different 
agencies (port authorities, airports, redevelopment agencies and other local government 
bodies), and product suppliers. The inevitability of gradualness – a phased extension of 
coverage – is necessitated by the “fragmentation of local government and the sheer 
number of public funding streams in an urban economy” (p. 31). The union role is also 
perceived very differently from Neumark: unions are directly tied to the effectiveness of 
the ordinances. Living wage laws are either targeted to cover groups that are likely to be 
organized or have recently been organized. Ordinances are also linked to related laws that 
help the climate for unionism such as labor peace laws. So the regulations are seen as 
structured to support union organizing. Next, the case studies link the success of living 
wage campaigns to inclusive coalitions of unions and community organizations (after 
admittedly fractious relationships in the 1960s and 1970s). Low-income peoples’ 
organizations and unions are said to be now organizing the same communities, and labor-
community coalitions are portrayed as instrumental to the formulation and passage of 
living wage ordinances. Links to national associations on each side of the coalition and 
integration of platforms, preferably in hybrid organizations, are also identified as   20
important ingredients of success. Finally, living wage ordinances have to be rooted in a 
broader “growth with equity” agenda, encompassing economic justice, high road 
competition and redevelopment/industry clusters. 
 
(vi) And a Postscript on Prevailing Wage Laws 
Prevailing wage laws at state level requiring construction workers on state-funded works 
projects be paid at levels prevailing for similar work in the geographic area of the project 
largely postdate federal legislation in the form of the 1931 Davis-Bacon Act
12 (although 
eight states enacted wage laws between 1891 and 1923). As of 1969, 40 states had 
prevailing wage laws on the books.  
 
Analysis of the effects of federal regulation on wages and construction costs confronts an 
identification problem – average wages in a location are themselves a function of the 
prevailing wage – so that research has shifted to exploit differences in state prevailing 
wage regulations (Thieblot, 1986). The most recent research focuses on the nine states 
that  repealed  their prevailing wage laws between 1969 and 1993. Kessler and Katz 
(1999) compare wage outcomes in repeal and non-repeal states (excluding Minnesota 
which passed prevailing wage legislation in 1973) using a difference-in-difference-in 
difference methodology and individual data from the Census and the Current Population 
Survey. So the test is essentially the difference between the change over time in the 
relative blue-collar construction/non-construction wage in the two sets of states. It is 
reported that repeal is associated with a decline in the relative wages of construction 
workers of between 2.3 and 3.9 percent. For union members however the relative wage 
premium on construction work is reduced by 5.9 percentage points, which effect 
increases to 11.2 percentage points after five years. Even if the immediate outcome gives 
the better estimate of the equilibrium effect of repeal the outcome is still major, the union 
premium being in the order of 20 percent. This careful study provides insights into the 
opposition of unions to repeal of state prevailing laws and an indication of the rent 
seeking that is involved in their passage.  What is lacking is an equally careful analysis of 
the political economy of repeal. 
   21
 
III. Conclusions 
Many of the labor laws that we now have on the books were adopted prior to the New 
Deal: limits on child labor, limits on working time, safety legislation, and workers’ 
compensation laws. As we have seen, the causes of some of these early pieces of 
legislation at state level have been analyzed and with them the bargaining process 
between employers and workers as filtered through state-level politics. Interestingly, we 
have far less information on the political economy of national labor mandates, since the 
modern preoccupation has been to analyze the effects of legislation. Viewed from this 
imperative, the causes of mandates have only been examined in the interests of obtaining 
unbiased estimates of their consequences. Auxiliary equations apart, the political 
involvement of the labor and product market actors have been adduced from the payoffs 
to them of legislation. Another interactive line of inquiry is opened up by the actions of 
the courts. At the broadest level, legislation has been seen as a broad antidote to the 
‘subversion’ of the courts. Less dramatically, individual pieces of legislation have been 
sponsored because of the high transactions costs of using the courts. On the other hand, 
recourse to the law has also been seen as a remedy for overarching state and local 
legislation. 
 
In reviewing the effects of U.S. labor legislation, Addison and Hirsch (1997, p. 166) 
remark that the empirical literature suggests that workplace mandates have rather muted 
benefits and costs, noting that the effects of mandates are mitigated in part through 
market escape routes, the shifting of costs, and the mobility of resources, and in part via a 
political process that shows some sensitivity to both benefits and costs. Our discussion of 
rent seeking, codification, coalitions, judicial review, and interjurisdictional competition 
gives some credence to this position, without of course claiming that the regulations 
generally work well for employers, employees, or for that matter the regulators 
 
Lest our limited discussion of national mandates still convey the impression that the U.S. 
labor market is unregulated at the federal level, however, let us dispel that notion by 
observing that by the mid-1990s the U.S. Department of Labor was administering some   22
180 regulatory programs covering labor standards, civil rights, occupational health and 
safety, labor relations, and hiring and separation decisions (see Commission on the Future 
of Worker-Management Relations, 1994a, b). At the time of the New Deal experiment 
the corresponding frequency was 18 and it was still only 40 as late as 1960.  
 
Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that there has been a rapidly expanding role of 
government and the courts in providing workers with rights and protections in the 
workplace. This development has moreover coincided with a marked decline in 
unionism. The feedback from laws to reduced unionism is difficult to pin down, but it 
seems inevitable that protection against various forms of discrimination, and legislation 
on worker safety, advance notice of plant closings, and mandated family leave have 
contributed to the reduced demand for unionism. In much of our discussion the 
maintained hypothesis has been that high union density strengthens the political influence 
of unions on legislation. Now the argument is the other side of the coin: further 
reductions in unionism are likely to yield increased reliance on government to define 
rights at the workplace. 
 
These prospects engender little enthusiasm because it is widely accepted that the system 
of employment protection is costly, intrusive, and overly litigious. Reform proposals are 
in the wing, centering on notions of conditional deregulation and so-called market based 
systems of enterprise rights (see, respectively, Levine, 1997; Edwards, 1997). Since these 
proposals seek to deliver a balance between flexibility/productivity and fairness, they 
inevitably return us to Dwight Lee’s (1996, p. 103) admonition: “Does anyone seriously 
believe that an efficient balance can be achieved through a political process?” But we are 
not speaking of the first best and arguably heightened globalization will have effects at 
federal level that interjurisdictional competition has apparently had at state and local 
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Endnotes 
1. Although it is as well to point out that the plethora of state bills seeking to restrict 
outsourcing (usually by banning the state from contracting with companies planning to 
employ offshore workers) would, if passed, likely succumb to legal challenge under the 
U.S. constitution on the grounds that they violate the Foreign Commerce Clause (Art. 1, 
§8, cl. 3). This clause restricts the states’ power to interfere with interstate or foreign 
commerce.  By the same token, even if never enacted into law such bills may already 
have had a chilling effect on the growth of IT outsourcing by local and state 
governments. 
2. On the issue of worker rents in the regulated trucking and airline industries, see Hirsch 
and Macpherson (1998, 2000). 
3. On the competing interests involved in environmental protection per se and the effects 
of regulation on factor shares and the size distribution of firms, see Pashigian (1984, 
1985).  
 4. As a practical matter, the authors combine the compliance costs of OSHA with those 
of the EPA, or, more accurately, assume that the two have the same proportional 
relationship throughout. This has to be kept in mind in what follows. 
5. I have neglected the issue of import competition. This study does include a measure of 
import penetration and reports that firms facing strong competitive pressures from 
imports are badly hurt by regulation. Specifically, where the value of industry net imports 
to shipments is at its maximum value of 40 percent, the effect of regulation is reduce 
profits by one half.  
6. Violations of the public policy and good faith doctrines are actionable irrespective of 
the identity of the employer, while staffing arrangements (such as temporary help) cannot 
be used to shield firms from civil rights compliance. So there are no advantages to 
temporary employment here. Only the implied contract exception offers relief in so far as 
THS employment is ipso facto temporary (other than for the line staff of the temporary 
employment agency itself). 
7. The main part of Autor, Donahue, and Schwab’s (2001) study is an analysis of the 
effect of the public policy, implied contract, and good faith exceptions upon state 
employment and wages, using data from the CPS monthly files, 1978-1999. Inconsistent   24
with Krueger (1991), the authors find a statistically significant negative effect of the 
public policy exception on wages, suggesting that workers pay for the attenuation of at-
will in one of the two categories deemed important by Krueger in generating proposals 
for an unjust dismissal statute. Consistent with Autor (2003), the authors find no 
reduction in wages associated with the implied contract exception and a small negative 
effect on employment (which adverse effect is strongest for less-educated males and 
younger workers).  
8. In addition to safety regulation and workers’ compensation, states also successfully 
introduced legislation limiting the hours of children and women. The laws seemingly had 
little independent impact, the main influence behind observed reductions in hours being 
technology (e.g. Goldin, 1990) In reviewing this literature, Fishback (1997, pp. 45) 
speculates that among the prime movers were those firms who had earlier most reduced 
their child labor and male-intensive industries respectively.  
9. Progressive era reformers also figure in Fishback’s model, and are depicted as seeking 
to impose reforms on larger employers.   
10. And even in these states most employers choose voluntary coverage so as to limit 
their liability  
11. Why the very lowest paid union workers are unaffected by the ordinances is 
something of a puzzle. 
12. Stigler (1970) and Heller (1986) contend – but do not test the argument – that federal 
minimum wages introduced under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938 were 
passed by the Congressional majority of northern states, wherein the envisaged minima 
were generally exceeded, so as to extinguish low-wage competition from the southern 
states who voted against the legislation. The raising rivals’ costs argument is more 
transparent in the case of prevailing wage legislation. In justifying the first draft of the 
bill in 1927, Congressman Bacon stated: 
“The Government is engaged in building in my district a Veteran’s Bureau hospital … 
Several New York contractors bid, and in their bids, of course, they had to take into 
consideration the high labor standards prevailing in the State of New York ... The bid, 
however, was let to a firm from Alabama who had brought several thousand non-union 
laborers from Alabama into Long Island, N.Y., into my district. They were herded onto 
this job, they were housed in shacks they were paid a very low wage, and the work 
proceeded … It seemed to me that the federal Government should not engage in   25
construction work in any state and undermine the labor conditions and the labor wages in 
that State … The least the federal government can do is comply with the local standards 
of wages and labor prevailing in the locality where the building construction is to take 
place.” (U.S. Congress, 1927.) 
 
Bacon’s proposal was eventually enacted into law in 1931, and it took another four years 
before the definition of the prevailing wage was determined. While we know of no 
formal analysis of the political economy of Davis-Bacon, the facts are that the 
regulations, and the manner of their enforcement, meant that wages were often set 
according to the union scale and that a 1935 amendment of the Act reduced the minimum 
contract amount covered to $2,000 (as sought the union movement). More recent 
criticism of Davis-Bacon has centered on its purported discriminatory intent: on the facts 
that the Alabama construction workers in question were black (contested) and most major 
construction workers at that time excluded blacks (uncontested) (cf. Bernstein, 1993; 
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